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THE EVOLUTION OF CONCESSION
AGREEMENTS IN UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES
NATIONAL INTEREST
Theodore H. Moran*
I.
Large natural resource projects in underdeveloped countries provide great benefits to United States investors, to host countries and
to the United States itself. Yet concession agreements to exploit
natural resources are notoriously controversial and notoriously
unstable. This article will examine the United States national interest in guaranteeing equity investments in foreign natural resource development and will argue that concession agreements in
large natural resource projects in the developing world go through
a highly predictable evolution, reflecting changes in the relative
bargaining positions of the foreign investors and the host governments. Initial agreements reflect the foreign company's quasimonopolistic control over the skills necessary to bring a major
operation on-line, and reflect a heavy discounting for the risk of
failure. The initial agreements may also reflect the host country's
ignorance of industry practices, and of international tax and accounting procedures. The result is that almost all large natural
resource concessions appear, after the fact, to have been written
with terms highly favorable to the foreign investor.
If the project is unsuccessful, the same or greater enticements
will be necessary to attract other investors. But if the project is
successful, the whole atmosphere surrounding the bargaining situation begins to change. A gamble with large risks has been won,
and the host government is unlikely to want to keep paying for long
a premium that reflects those risks. In fact, for a host country
observing a foreign operation successfully producing a large flow of
revenue to the parent company, it may be politically impossible
* Research Associate, Project on Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution; private consultant on foreign investment.
B.A., 1965, M.A., 1969, Ph.D., 1971, Harvard University. An earlier version of this
paper appeared in the author's testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1973.
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not to revise the terms of the initial concession. Clearly, the balance of power that started with a steep tilt in the direction of the
foreign investor has now shifted to a tilt in the direction of the host
country. Empirically, very few large-scale successful concession
agreements in underdeveloped countries have remained long unaltered.
Just before new foreign corporate commitments are sought, the
balance of power is weighted heavily toward the foreign investor
and terms are dictated largely along lines that he chooses. After
each foreign corporate commitment is begun, the balance of power
begins to shift back in favor of the host country and prior terms
are renegotiated.
Whether one likes it or not, the negotiation and renegotiation of
large concession agreements is a "political" process reflecting the
relative bargaining strengths of foreign investor and host country.
In transactions in which there are such abrupt shifts in the balance
of power, the idea of a "sacred contract" with "inviolability"
stretching typically 20 or 40 or 99 years into the future is peculiarly
inappropriate. There is a continuing play of pressures from both
sides to rearrange terms a little more to their own benefit. To argue
that there should not be such a play of pressures, because of the
"sanctity" of the original contract, is only to argue that agreements
should always be frozen (and implicity enforced) on terms very
favorable to the foreign investors.
Not mysteriously, foreign investors respect contracts that are
inevitably written heavily in their favor. There should be no mystery why host governments may try to "readjust" contracts, when
possible, in their own favor. The so-called "bursts or waves" of
emotion and economic nationalism are no less "rational" ways of
testing the strength of the country's bargaining position than the
formal contracts with the ritual 20, 40 or 99 year guarantees of
"inviolability" are a way of celebrating the foreign investors' moments of strength.
In fact, the game of joint-maximization played in foreign investment is a process of on-going mutual adjustment in which the
foreign investors act in accord with their own best interests when
they are in the strongest position and accede to necessity when
they are weak and exposed, while host governments accede to necessity when they are weak and act in accord with their own best
interests as they gain strength.
The problem with this process, however, is that it generates
extraordinary levels of tension and extreme perceptions of injustice
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and exploitation. The initial concession agreements, once successful, always look in retrospect like cases of the strong cheating the
weak, and political groups in the host country can generate great
campaigns from this perception. The renegotiation process, in the
perception of the foreign investor, represents the host country (now
strong) beginning to cheat him (now weak) and he can generate
campaigns of his own on this issue.
Some of the tensions that ensue are inevitable, and are independent of the character of the actors involved. A corporate board of
directors-no matter how careful to observe its role as a "good
corporate citizen" overseas-would consider itself irresponsible if
it did not take advantage of its bargaining strengths. A host government-of its own accord or under pressure from political opponents-would consider itself irresponsible if it did not take advantage of its bargaining strengths.
The task of United States policy should be to move in the direction of preserving the benefits obtained from foreign investment in
underdeveloped countries while minimizing the tensions that are
generated in the process.
This paper will suggest that the practice of guaranteeing American equity investment probably' has the effect of exacerbating the
tensions involved and hindering experimentation with new kinds
of arrangements between American companies and host countries
that might produce the same benefits with fewer political and
economic costs.
The inappropriateness to this kind of project of the straight equity investment via the long-term concession contract (with or
without United States backing) does not preclude such ventures
from being carried out in an orderly and relatively dependable
fashion with attractive returns to all concerned. Examples of alternative arrangements-management contracts, service contracts,
debt funding, factoring, equity investment with options for systematic divestment-will be introduced to show how they might
better conform to the course that the foreign company-host country relations will follow anyway. Many large American corporations now act in essentially a service-management capacity in
Latin America, Africa and South Asia to supply raw materials on
1. It should be emphasized that there has been no definitive survey to test
these propositions-nor could there be as long as the United States investment
guarantee program continues to function.
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contract to European and Japanese processors and consumers, yet
the American companies are the target of nationalistic attacks
because they have formal ownership through a relatively small
equity investment, while the Japanese and Europeans are seen as
the benevolent suppliers of markets for the output.
The ideal would be a shift toward more flexible arrangements in
which the expectations of both sides include those abrupt swings
in the balance of power and in which both sides have an interest
in keeping those swings within the margins agreed to in advance.
This would be a step in the direction of the Calvo Doctrine, by
which United States companies and the United States Government could give up reliance on the threat of a Big Stick in the
background (whether exercised unilaterally or via multinational
agencies) that the host countries find intolerable and the companies find ineffective.
Clearly, a shift away from equity investment in general, and
away from United States Government-guaranteed equity investment in particular, will not solve all the problems of American
businesses overseas. No cosmetic repackaging of the contributions
of American companies will make certain zero-sum disputes about
the distribution of benefits disappear, even if the repackaging does
manage to do away with some of the tense issues of "sub-soil
rights," "foreign ownership" and "foreign control." In fact, there
is evidence to indicate that a shift away from direct ownership on
the part of American businesses overseas may add some real economic costs to host countries.
The gains, however, will show up in a diminution of unproductive disputes about whether a course of foreign investor-host country relations that is empirically inevitable is morally just.
Finally, this paper offers the suggestion that a more flexible
approach to the form in which large natural resource projects are
negotiated might have diplomatic benefits as well. The United
States would find itself less frequently locked with inflexibility
("unintentionally," "bureaucratically," "legalistically") into defending a contract in an underdeveloped country that no identifiable United States policy-maker believes is in the national interest.
II.
How should one approach the problem of trying to understand
the tensions that are generated between host countries and large
natural resource companies?
Spring, 1974
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Most businessmen and economists use game theory and bargaining models, especially the bilateral monopoly model, as a frame2
work for analyzing foreign investor-host country relations.
The foreign investor has resources, skills, experience and access
to markets and finance that the host country needs to develop its
resource base. The country has the mineral wealth, the labor force
and the control over taxation that may be mixed in some proportion to produce an attractive opportunity to the investor. Unless
the host government loves foreign investors no matter how they
behave, on the one hand, or is anxious to keep foreigners out no
matter what the cost, on the other, then the terms under which a
foreign investor will be allowed to enter the country and operate
there constitute a problem in joint-maximization.
As both the foreign investor and the host government try to
increase their returns from the industry, each side has threats to
make and benefits to offer. The struggle centers on the relative
distribution of revenues that are being generated or that potentially could be generated in the industry. This is not a zero-sum
game since the absolute level of returns is a function of the relative
shares. Some kinds of collaborative strategies can increase the size
of the pie to be divided and increase the absolute returns to all
parties. The host government must weigh the benefits of demanding a larger share of the existing revenue against the prospect of a
large absolute amount (but a smaller share) of revenue if the investor can be induced to expand operations. The foreign investor must
weigh his prospects for further profits on the original investment
against the chance for larger profits on expanded operations.
This kind of explicit bargaining generally characterizes relations
between the large American natural resource companies and various host governments each time major new corporate commitments are sought.
But the conventional framework of game theory or bargaining
models is not dynamic enough to show underlying trends or cycles
2.

Cf.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES: CASE

(R. Mikesell ed. 1971) [hereinafter
(1969); C.
(2d ed. 1965); E. PENROSE, NEW

STUDIES IN INVESTOR-HOST COUNTRY RELATIONS

cited as R. Mikesell]; C.
KINDLEBERGER,

KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

ORIENTATIONS: ESSAYS

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1970); T.

SHELLING, THE

(1963); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (1966); Penrose,
Profit Sharing Between Producing Countries and Oil Companies in the Middle
East, 69 ECON. J. 238 (1959).
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
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in bargaining strength. To understand why natural resource concessions :' in underdeveloped countries are so unstable and so controversial, it is necessary to formulate some idea of the evolution
of the balance of power between the foreign investor and the host
government.'
First, the characteristics of the typical project 5 in oil, for example, or natural gas, should be examined. The typical natural resource project involves a large, discrete, lump-sum investment
with a long gestation period, a high ratio of fixed to variable costs,
and little opportunity for incremental adjustments of output at the
margin. Despite costly surveys, test drillings and feasibility studies, little valuable information can be learned about final production costs on the whole project until it is actually on-line. Often
operating in the most inhospitable regions imaginable, the large
natural resource investor does not begin to get any meaningful
return from his investment until the hole is dug or drilled, the mill
or refinery is erected, the railroad built, the port constructed and

3. The generic term "natural resource concessions" is used here even though
many countries call the agreements by some other name. What is meant is that
there is a special category of activity associated with the primary export sector-a
special tax regime, a special import arrangement, a special juridical category for
"subsoil rights," frequently a special foreign exchange arrangement, and a special
regulatory agency-corresponding to the "sensitive" status that the sector occupies in the life of the host country and not covered under the laws of general
application.
4. For a development of this approach see R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY:
THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF

U.S.

ENTERPRISES

(1971); Vernon, Long-Run

Trends in Concession Contracts, 1967 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 81. See also
Moran, Politics of Economic Nationalism and the Evolution of Concession
Agreements, 1972 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 216; Moran, Pulling, Pushing, and
Shoving: A Model of the Dialecticsof ForeignInvestment, in COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (1972); L. WELLS, THE EVOLUTION OF CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
(EcoN. DEVELOPMENT REP. No. 117, 1969).
5. This model most accurately corresponds to natural resource oligopolies
when the largest barriers to entry exist at the production stage. In other natural
resource industries in which the barriers are located in processing or marketing
farther downstream outside the immediate reach of the host government-in
aluminum or tropical agriculture, for example-the investor has more alternatives for protecting himself against the challenge of economic nationalism.
The model can also be easily modified to cover other industries in which investments can be introduced incrementally and uncertainty reduced at less
cost-such as in most manufacturing industries.
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hundreds of millions of dollars completely sunk and gone. In short,
he must make a substantial commitment under conditions of great
uncertainty with little opportunity to test or adjust incrementally.
What does this mean in initial bargaining terms between the
host country and the foreign investor?
When a representative of Anaconda, Jersey Standard or Bethlehem Steel walks into the presidential office of a small underdeveloped country and announces, say, that he has plans to build a
100,000-metric-ton-per-year copper mine if the president is interested, he holds at this point all the cards in his hands. The foreign
mining company enjoys near-monopoly control over the resources
and the knowledge that the host country needs to develop a major
tax-producing, foreign exchange-producing, employmentproducing operation-a monopoly control that only a few fellow
oligopolists could supply at broadly similar prices.
The host country, for its part, is able to evaluate the location and
value of potential mineral deposits even less adequately than the
foreign investors. Consequently, no matter what the ideological
complexion of the government, no matter whether the host government is composed of fierce nationalists or of weak bribe-takers, the
host country must initially accept terms heavily weighted in favor
of the foreign investor or end up with nothing at all.
And no matter how "nice" an investor the foreign company is,
no matter how much of a "good corporate citizen," he would consider himself irresponsible to commit such a large sum of money
with such high risks unless the incentive of a potentially high rate
of return were promised. Thus, writers who stress that behavior as
a good corporate citizen can alleviate the tension generated by the
investment process would have a very weak case with large natural
resource concession agreements since the extreme disparity of bargaining power will exist at the initiation of any concession agreement, independent of the character of the bargainers.
The result is that new concession agreements in natural resource
industries invariably seem to have been written along lines largely
dictated by the foreign investors with the length of the contract
typically set at 20, 40 or 99 years.
III.
But there is a dialectic in the balance of power between the
foreign investor and the host country that does not stop when the
investment is sunk. If the investment is made and is unsuccessful,
Vol. 7-No. 2
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the foreigner has taken his risk, has lost his bet, and can share his
grief with the Internal Revenue Services of the countries where he
operates. Other investors would need the same or more generous
treatment to make another try. But once an investment is made
and the operation is a success, the terms of the situation totally
change. Uncertainty is reduced, and the old doubts are forgotten.
In the natural resource field, uncertain investments are frequently
turned into quite lucrative operations. The host government gazes
out at the profitable operation carrying off resources the country
was sure it had all along, with a large share of the revenue flowing
away to foreigners. The foreign investor has made his bet and won,
but the host government is unlikely to want to keep paying on the
ticket in perpetuity. The premium paid to the foreign investor year
after year is likely to seem, in retrospect, too high, and the government in power is likely to argue at some point that the country is
being exploited. If the government in power does not draw that
conclusion, its political opponents will.
The host country perception of being exploited, like the foreign
company perception of being cheated when contracts are broken,
emerges almost irrespective of what the actual figures are that
divide profits between host government and foreigner. To take an
example from the history of the copper industry in Chile,' various
administrations in Santiago over the course of the past half century have looked back five to ten years later on negotiations that
had reduced the tax rate' on Anaconda and Kennecott to 18 per
cent, to 33 per cent, to 55 per cent and to 60 per cent, and in each
case drew the same conclusion-that the country had gotten the
rotten end of the deal. Forced into renegotiation, the North American companies saw their average annual return on investment re6. For the history of Anaconda and Kennecott in Chile see M. MAMALAKIS
& C. REYNOLDS, ESSAYS ON THE CHILEAN ECONOMY (1965); R. Mikesell, supra note
2, at 7; T. MORAN, EL COBRE Es CHILENO: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND
THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF COPPER IN CHILE 1945-1972 (Harvard
Univ. Center for Int'l Affairs, 1973); A. PINTO, CHILE: UN CASE DE DESARRELLE
FRUSTRADE (Editorial Universitaria, Santiago 1959); A. PINTO, HACIA NUESTRA
INDEPENDENCIA ECON6MICA (Editorial del Pacifico, Santiago 1953); M. VALENZUELA, LAW POL'TICA ECON6MICA DEL COBRE EN CHILE

(Universidad de Chile, San-

tiago 1961).
7. The swing of loosening and tightening terms in concession agreements
usually applies simultaneously to rates of depletion and depreciation, exchange
convertibility, repatriation of profits, import privileges, and so forth.
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duced at various times to 35 per cent, 25 per cent and 15 per cent
and felt that they were being unfairly treated.
The long-term concession contract is a uniquely inappropriate
means of establishing expectations about the relations between
host countries and foreign investors. Once the uncertainty has
been dispelled and the risk reduced, the terms of the concession
no longer correspond to the "realities" of the situation. Almost all
successful natural resource contracts look, after the fact, like unjust treatment of the weak by the strong. In a certain sense, this
is true-since concession contracts are always written in terms
very favorable to strong foreigners. To follow a purely legalistic
course-to uphold the principle of "sanctity of contract" in a situation in which fluctuating risk and uncertainty mean that ceteris
do not long remain paribus-is in effect to affirm that agreements
should always be frozen in terms very favorable to foreign investors.
Accompanying the changing perception of justice, however, is a
shift in the balance of power toward the host country. Once the
foreign company has sunk its capital, it will continue to run a
successful operation even though its share of the revenues might
be reduced. In contrast to its prior weakness, the host country now
begins to have good cards in its hands. A sense of being exploited
by foreigners and the power to do something about it are an explosive political combination. Effective pressures for "renegotiations," "surtaxes," "recomputations" or "adjustments" to reflect
the shift in bargaining strength from the foreign company to the
host country, can easily be mobilized. Empirically, since the end
of the Second World War, few successful concession agreements in
developing countries-in ferrous and nonferrous metals, petroleum, sulphur and natural gas-have remained long unaltered?
8. In addition, each time that mines or wells are successfully brought on-line,
uncertainty about the existence of subsoil wealth and about the structure of
production costs has been reduced for subsequent investors. The host government
is able to drive a tougher bargain with later entrants, and this in turn increases
the pressure to revise the original contracts to be more in line with the later
agreements.
9.

For case studies see E. LIEUWEN, PETROLEUM IN VENEZUELA: A HISTORY

(1954); E. LIEUWEN, VENEZUELA (1965); R. Mikesell, supra note 2, at 29; Z. MIKDASHI,

THE COMMUNITY OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT

COOPERATION (1972); T. MORAN, supra note 6, at 29; E. PENROSE, THE LARGE
INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Vol. 7-No. 2

(1969); M.

TANZER, THE POLITICAL

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W

Under the pressure of "nationalistic" governments of various ideological hue, they are sooner or later renegotiated.
IV.
Theoretically, the swing back and forth in the balance of power
could continue indefinitely. But the experience of most developing
countries with a rich natural resource endowment is better represented by introducing the idea of a learning curve on the part of
the host country.
A country that has no history of large natural resource concessions probably begins with a very inexact knowledge of the extent
of its mineral or petroleum wealth and is in an inferior position to
the foreign investor to conduct independent explorations or make
reliable feasibility studies. There has been no occasion to build up
a bureaucracy with skill in analyzing proposals for natural resource
development. In many cases host governments are not initially
familiar enough with transnational corporate accounting, with international tax provisions or with terms of concessions in other
countries to make a negotiation process very meaningful.
In much of the Third World before the Second World War, even
in regions not formally colonized, initial investments in resource
extractions were undertaken with only the most primitive attempts at bargaining. When the international oil companies first
approached General Vincente G6mez of Venezuela or King Ibn
Saud of Saudi Arabia, they were invited to draft their own petroleum legislation. ' ° The early international investments in tin,
bauxite, zinc and iron ore were made under much the same conditions. The possibility of earning foreign revenues from unknown
mineral deposits appeared as a windfall and primitive forms of tax
collection, frequently royalty payments, were the reward collected
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL AND THE UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(1969); R.

VERNON, supra note 4, at 29; Barnes, InternationalOil Companies Confront Governments:A Half-Century of Experience, 16 INT'L STUDIES Q. 454 (1972); Vernon,

supra note 4; L. WELLS, supra note 4, at 29.
10. Cf. E. LIEUWEN, PETROLEUM IN VENEZUELA: A HISTORY, supra note 9, at 30;
E. LIEUWEN, VENEZUELA, supra note 9, at 30; Edwards, ForeignPetroleum Companies and the State in Venezuela, in R. Mikesell, supranote 2, at 101; Harris, The
Impact of the PetroleumExport Industry on the Patternof Venezuelan Economic
Development, in R. Mikesell, supra note 2, at 129; Moran, The Politics of Oil:
Coups and Costs, [1972] FOREIGN POLICY 129; Wells, Aramco: The Evolution of
an Oil Concession, in R. Mikesell, supra note 2, at 216.
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by governments ill-equipped to judge adequately how far they
could push against the companies."
Successful ventures, however, provide an incentive for the host
country to develop a bureaucracy with skills and expertise appropriate to the industry. From a very low position, the country starts
to move up a learning curve in analyzing proposals, accumulating
experience in monitoring corporate behavior and acquiring knowledge about the dynamics of the industry.
The incentive to chip away at the foreigner's monopoly on skills
and expertise is magnified as demands for a larger share of the
revenues grow and as claims on those revenues multiply. When the
oil companies first established themselves in the Middle East, the
fiscal needs of the host governments were little more than the
personal expenses of their followers and the patronage of their
political clientele. But as the Second World War and decolonization brought social mobilization,' 2 urbanization and importsubstituting industrialization to these regions, the necessity of
thinking in terms of maximizing revenues from resource extraction
began to become a crucial political issue. Even those governments
most effectively manipulated by the foreign companies were not
immune to such pressures.' 3 After Premier Mossadegh nationalized
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 to finance the First Iranian
Development Plan, he was overthrown. But state revenues from
the petroleum sector have not stopped rising, nor have domestic
pressures allowed them even to remain level for any two-year period since the subsequent agreements with the Iranian Oil Consor11. Royalties-or excise taxes-in oil exporting countries now, however, play
a special role in oligopoly discipline. Taxes per barrel-royalties or excise taxes
in fact even though they may be income taxes in form-are at the present time
negotiated jointly by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to provide a tax floor above which the market is allowed to allocate production shares
on the basis of operating costs. In the absence of the power to set production
quotas for individual countries directly, then, taxes per barrel is the method by
which the producing countries discipline each other in restricting production. See
M.A.

ADELMAN,

THE

WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET

(1972).

For the literature on social mobilization see S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL
ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political
Development, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 493 (1961); Olsen, Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, 23 J. ECON. HISTORY 529 (1963); Tanter & Midlarsky, A Theory of
Revolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 264 (1967).
13. See Bartsch, The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Economy of Iran, in
R. Mikesell, supra note 2, at 237. See also materials cited note 10 supra.
12.
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tium were renegotiated in 1954. The profit split between Iran and
the Consortium climbed from 68 per cent/32 per cent in 1954 to
about 80 per cent/20 per cent by 1970. In Venezuela, even the
dictator (General) Perez Jim6nez, who overthrew the more "nationalistic" R6mulo Betancourt in 1950 with the promise of helping
the foreign oil companies, found that he constantly needed more
revenues to finance urban construction and industrial growth. He
provoked a crisis in the international industry in 1956 by cancelling
options given in earlier contracts to the foreign companies and
auctioning off large concessions to new companies more willing
than the old ones to expand production. Successor governments in
Venezuela pushed the host country share of petroleum revenues
above 70 per cent in the 1960's with a national commitment to
"sow the petroleum" for development. The value of incremental
revenues to sustain growth or to dissipate social tensions in countries that are undergoing rapid development and social mobilization is too high and the political temptation too great to allow
foreign companies a stable existence.
The very importance of the foreign-controlled industry to the
social and economic welfare of the host country renders it inseparable from issues of national sovereignty.'" To return to the example
of copper in Chile, for four decades the pace and direction of national development in that country have been dictated by the performance of Anaconda and Kennecott. Copper has constituted as
much as 80 per cent of Chilean exports and has provided the bulk
of the government's hard currency revenues. To put the importance of the industry into perspective, one might consider the following: all of Fortune's 500 largest United States corporations
combined do not approach the role in the economy of the United
States or pay more than a fraction of the percentage of United
States taxes that Anaconda and Kennecott alone supply for Chile.
All the ranches in Texas, the banks in New York, and the aerospace industry in the Northwest are not as responsible economically for the fate of their respective states as the copper industry
is for Chile.
To have the copper industry run by self-appointed and self14. Issues of sovereignty are heightened in natural resource industries in many
countries because of legal traditions in which subsoil rights are regarded as the
inalienable patrimony of the nation over which the government does not cede
ownership but merely grants privileges of exploitation.
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perpetuating foreign groups according to strategies based on their
own internal corporate needs must easily be seen as a threat as well
as an insult to national dignity. The threat exists even without
emphasizing the possibility, which no Chilean (or Iranian or Venezuelan) can afford to ignore, that the foreign managers may be
intimately linked to hostile intelligence agencies, as in the International Telephone and Telegraph episode in Chile. A natural mistrust of concentrations of power, especially concentrations of foreign power, in an area so vital to national development, means that
there will be a preference for domestic control and a probable
consensus to pay some price for domestic control."a
Thus, as a developing country moves up a learning curve of
bargaining skills and supervisory skills, the relations with foreign
investors do not merely swing back and forth. Rather, those relations look more like the schematic representation in Diagram One.
DIAGRAM ONE

TOTAL

TIME
Note: since returns are a function of final market prices, the curves will not be smooth.

For this approach to the analysis of economic nationalism see ECONOMIC
Johnson ed. 1967); Breton, The Economics of Nationalism, 72 J. POL. ECON. 376 (1964); Johnson, An Economic Theory
of Protectionism:Tariff Bargaining,and the Formationof Customs Unions, 73 J.
15.

NATIONALISM IN OLD AND NEW STATES (H.

POL. ECON. 256 (1965).
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At the extreme right end of the curve, the country may acquire
the skills to operate the industry directly. What may have begun
as only a rhetorical dream of "recovering control of the natural
wealth" and "restoring sovereignty over national development"
may come at last within the reach of the host country.
Such an outcome cannot, however, be predicted clearly in advance. From the beginning to the end, the way in which the changing balance of power will be manipulated is a function of the perception of the advantages that the foreign management is contributing to the performance of the industry or a function of the perception of the cost of replacing or doing without those advantages.
V.
Some host countries may diversify exports sufficiently so that
they no longer depend on one or two foreign-dominated industries
for growth and development. Foreign investment in natural resource development then might decline in public prominence to a
sufficient extent to permit local authorities to treat such projects
under the commercial laws of general application in the country.
Alternatively, host country nationals might enter the industry in
sufficient strength to produce the same effect. This would be one
scenario in which relations between the foreign investor and the
host country would move easily and spontaneously away from the
tensions associated with the balance-of-power bargaining paradigm.
Other countries may find formulas for hiring scarce foreign talents in such a way that many of the tensions of "foreign ownership," "foreign control," "sub-soil rights" and "threats to sovereignty" do not arise. Management contracts, service contracts and
joint ventures (with majority ownership by local government agencies or host country nationals)" may be a more palatable way of
obtaining foreign services without creating political reaction than
is direct foreign ownership via (United States Government guaranteed) equity investment. In this scenario repackaging the relations
16. The rationale for joint ventures is that local partners presumably will
fight for accounting practices, financial practices and pricing practices that will
make the highest profits possible show up within the taxing jurisdiction of the
host country. A counter-argument is frequently advanced, however, to the effect
that local partners become an elite interest group fighting against the public
interest for favorable treatment for the foreign investors.
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between foreign companies and the host country would not necessarily eliminate constant adjustments according to relative bargaining strengths but might keep such adjustments within limits
more tolerable to the expectations of both sides. The foreign company would be paid directly, and perhaps handsomely, for services
rendered and need not create an operation on its own from
whose ownership it then expects to collect a stream of rents in
perpetuity.
Finally, some countries (and some companies) may find direct
investment via equity ownership to be the only feasible means of
setting up a natural resource enterprise-even though both sides
realize that this places the foreigner in a politically and economically sensitive position. The foreign investor is welcomed into the
country only because he possesses some quasi-monopolistic advantage that cannot be transferred any other way. The burden will fall
on him, if he chooses to occupy the exposed position, to demonstrate that his presence continues to offer clear advantages that
would be very costly to the country to replace or do without.
Doubtless there are many corporations whose expertise is so valuable and tightly held that they can occupy reasonably unassailable positions as the balance of power swings back and forth for long
periods of time. And doubtless there are some corporations that are
willing to respond to the challenge of nationalism by bringing more
and more resources to the service of the country for a considerable
period of time. Even in these cases, however, it would be wise to
introduce into the expectations of both sides an anticipation of
swings in the pendulum of power, including a possible final swing
in the host country's favor when the domestic benefits of nationalization finally appear to outweigh the costs of doing without the
foreigner. The foreign corporation, as well as the host country, may
discover the value of thinking seriously about introducing into the
initial negotiations' 7 an option of systematic divestment'" with the
margins of compensation agreed to in advance. To protect such an

17. One corporate argument against the option for systematic divestment in
natural resource oligopolies is that they will lose control over the ability to coordinate production. But there is no reason why a goal of United States public policy
should be to support the power of oligopolies to exact a rent from final consumers
through restricting output.
18. Cf. A. HIRSCHMAN, How to Divest in Latin America, and Why, in A BIAS
FOR HOPE: ESSAYS ON DEVELOPMENT AND LATIN AMERICA (1971).
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agreement, perhaps, a certain sum from taxes or from depletion/depreciation, or both, could be put in escrow in the hands of
an independent third party. This would spread the risk of nationalization between host country and foreign investor while insuring
that successor governments would bear identical costs (namely the
loss of the services of the foreigner plus the loss of the amount
agreed to as compensation) if they chose nationalization.
The aim of United States Government policy should be to encourage arrangements that maintain or increase the benefits generated by the overseas operations of American companies, that eliminate or minimize unproductive tensions and disputes about foreign ownership, and that anticipate and deal realistically with the
course that foreign company-host country relations are bound to
follow. Both companies and countries should be stimulated to recognize and deal creatively with the tensions they cause each other,
and to experiment with agreements that each has an interest in
maintaining.
Much tiresome prose is spent asking rhetorically whether there
is an "essential" community of interest between foreign investors
and host countries, or an "essential" conflict of interest. What is
needed is an effort to bring the real community of interest between
foreign investors and host countries to bear in working out methods
of adjusting for the real conflicts of interest.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the policy of giving United
States Government guarantees to direct equity investment in natural resources runs directly counter to encouraging these creative
arrangements. Why should the management of a United States
corporation waste valuable time and effort experimenting with
ways to spread risk and avoid potential disputes sometime in the
future when the United States Government stands ready to assume the burden of the investment risk and become a party to
disputes at any point defined by the company? The saving grace
of the -government guaranteed investment policy posture in the
past is that it has been notoriously ineffective, and has been so
recognized by the more agile and perceptive executives in the
American business community.
In the past decade, these executives have increasingly been experimenting with ways of spreading risk among final consumers,
host governments, financial intermediaries and themselves." More
19.

Cf. Moran, TransnationalStrategies of Protectionand Defense by MultiSpring, 1974
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and more capital for natural resource development has been raised
in advance from processors and consumers, from financial institutions through various kinds of factoring (that is, selling collection
rights to long-term contracts to a financial intermediary at a discount) or from host country participation. There are currently
many American companies in South Asia, Africa and Latin America that went into business only after processors or customers in
Japan or Western Europe advanced them money for contracts for
output stretching to the end of the life of the mine or the well. 21 In
relation to traditional practices, they have high debt-to-equity ratios in which perhaps only about fifteen per cent of the risk capital
was raised in the name of the American parent.
Yet the equity is owned by the American parent, frequently with
a guarantee.from the United States Government. The company is
the actual or potential target of nationalistic attack. And the
United States Government is the "imperalistic power" liable to
become drawn into a diplomatic dispute, directly or via multilateral lending agencies, with the host country. 2' The Japanese or
West European consortia for whom the American mining or drilling companies are working on what amounts to a service contract
are viewed, meanwhile, as providing kindly access to final markets.
In view of the successful experimentation that American companies have begun to spread their financial risk, it seems reasonable
to predict that they would be equally imaginative in working out
new arrangements to avoid the tensions of direct ownership if they
did not have the large disincentive provided by the United States
guarantee program.

national Corporations:Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationaliza-

tion in Natural Resources, 27
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273 (1973).

20. This does not imply any inside knowledge of the corporate arrangements.
One can follow the details of such arrangements in such journals as The Engineering and Mining Journal, the PetroleumPress Service, and the annual reports of
the major natural resource companies.
21. The movement of the Nixon administration away from dealing with disputes involving United States companies overseas through such threats as that
of the Hickenlooper Amendment toward votes against loans from multilateral
lending agencies will serve the purposes suggested here only if it is in effect a
signal to United States investors that they can expect no effective help from the
United States Government. Otherwise, it is just as counterproductive as the old
interventionism while being even less effective.
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It should be emphasized that novel arrangements would not
necessarily be less costly to host countries, in purely financial
terms, than the traditional arrangements are now. (Indeed, by
having to bear new costs, host countries may come to appreciate
the benefits of the old system.) Host countries may have to supply
more of the venture capital for new projects, or, if the host states
try to raise capital by selling long-term contracts, they will find
that the cost is quite high. To make their agreements on compensation credible, host countries may have to forego some tax revenue
or post a lump-sum bond. They may have to bear more of the
burden of risk of failure of new projects and not be able to share it
with or push it off on the foreign companies. They may find that
operating at arms-length with foreign companies on service or
management contracts is more, not less, costly than the system of
direct foreign investment. They may discover, as the evidence indicates,2 2 that jointly owned subsidiaries (especially when the host
government or host country nationals are majority partners) are
charged a higher proportion of common overhead expenses by the
foreign partner's parent than wholly owned subsidiaries. Finally,
they may come to realize that dependence on a distant impersonal
market price for selling their output may be no more helpful to
their balance of payments problems and developmental aspirations than the transfer prices of vertically integrated foreign corporations-even though the challenge to national sovereignty seems
less.
The benefits will come through avoiding the major breakdowns
and major losses that occur through acrimonious nationalizations,
sudden expropriations and destructive waves of economic nationalism. A realistic approach to accommodating the challenge of
economic nationalism can reduce the uncertainty and hence the
costs borne by all sides in the production of natural resources.
VI.
To the economic savings should be added diplomatic benefits as
well. Given the dialectical relations between foreign investors and
22. J. STOPFORD & L. WELLS, MANAGING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
(1973); R. VERNON, supra note 4; Franko, Strategy Choice and Multinational
Corporate Tolerance for Joint Ventures with ForeignPartners (D.B.A. dissertation, on file at the Harvard Univ. Graduate School of Business Administration,
1969).
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host countries, there would be political as well as economic profit
in making a virtue of necessity instead of spending bitter years
arguing futilely about the necessity of virtue. If concession agreements moved away from equity ownership or included the option
of systematic divestment and if procedures were adopted for regular renegotiation of terms, United States diplomacy would probably find itself less frequently locked into the defense of a business
contract that a middle-management team from a big corporation
23
negotiated from a position of strength years in the past.
United States foreign policy is critically described as overly legalistic, bureaucratically determined and unresponsive to the
wishes of top policy-makers. It is a mystery to many public policy
analysts why the United States regularly produces policy outcomes, especially at the intermediate level just below the "high
politics" of the White House, State, Defense and Treasury, that
put the country in the apparent position of the inflexible, dogmatic, unrealistic exploiter, despite the "better judgment" of the
policy formulators.
This study of the balance of power between American investors
and host countries may provide both an explanation and a cure.
It shows that the evolution of concession contracts is likely to
present United States policy makers with recurring crises of a kind
with which they are particularly ill-equipped to deal imaginatively. They are presented with presently broken contracts that
have been solemnly signed by host country governments in a moment of weakness years in the past, with disputes that frequently
have escalated to the stage of nationalization or expropriation, and
with pleas by businesses that have probably been the least agile
and most inflexible in the industry in the past and that are now
weak and have nowhere else to turn. Corporations did not invite
policy makers to pass judgment on whether they were making too
23. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 126 Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) (testimony of R. Goodwin and L. Einaudi); Goodwin, Letter from Peru,
THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 1969, at 64. See also R. BLOOMFIELD, WHO MAKES
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY? SOME LATIN AMERICAN CASE STUDIES (Harvard Center

for Int'l Affairs, Mar., 1972); J. LEVINSON & J. DE

ONIS, THE ALLIANCE THAT LOST

A CRITICAL REPORT ON THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS (1970); Mitchell,
Dominationand Incoherence in U.S. Latin American Policy, in POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA (R. Fagen & J. Cotler eds.
1974).
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much profit in the past, but they put policy makers under pressure
to Affirm that the company is being forced to accept too little profit
or compensation now. If middle-level policy makers side with the
corporations in these "routine" crises, they face the outrage of the
host countries; if they side with the countries, they face the outrage
of the corporations and their allies in the Congress.2 1 Policy makers
are faced 'with the choice of adopting a legalistic solution, or else
of trying to work out a compromise at a point chosen by the companies and under the worst possible conditions.
It is a messy undertaking that they are not prepared to handle
well. A realistic appraisal of our capacity to effect change in a
positive way would suggest that it is an undertaking that they
should not be handling at all.

24. This is true regardless whether the investment-or the debt-has been
formally guaranteed by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
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